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An Alternative Justification for Judicial
Abstention in Politically Sensitive Disputes
Involving Acts of Foreign States
International Association of Machinists v. Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981)
Legal disputes involving acts of foreign states' have been a
source of great judicial tension for many years. The notion that
each nation in the international sphere coexists with all others as
an equal presents problems of enormous magnitude when United
States courts are called upon to adjudicate matters penetrating the
sovereign confines of other independent nations. The fear of inter-
rupting the ongoing relationships that the United States maintains
with other foreign nations creates an acute sensitivity among do-
mestic courts in dealing with international problems no matter
how valid or "domestically oriented" they may be. Devices have
emerged to aid the courts in determining when judicial interven-
tion is proper and when abstention is the appropriate course. The
inherent difficulty in applying two of the most significant of these
devices is revealed in International Association of Machinists.
The ninth circuit examines the interrelationship of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 and the "act of state" doctrine*
and attempts to revitalize the latter in its affirmance of the lower
court in International Association of Machinists v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
4
The suit was commenced in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California by the International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) against the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The com-
plaint alleged that OPEC was engaged in price-setting activities in
1. The use of the term "states" in this discussion refers to its international usage denot-
ing nations as opposed to the domestic states of the United States.
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-
1611 (1976) (hereinafter cited as FSIA].
3. Although the "act of state" doctrine has no specific constitutional or statutory
source, it has been held to have "constitutional underpinnings." Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
4. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
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violation of United States antitrust laws.5 Members of IAM, who
work in petroleum-using industries, were disturbed by the high
price of oil and petroleum derived products in the United States.
They believed OPEC was the cause of this burden and proceeded
to sue OPEC and its member nations.
JAM brought suit in December of 1978 alleging price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act,' and requested treble damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to the Clayton Act.' The defendants re-
fused to recognize the court's jurisdiction and failed to appear
before the district court. OPEC's cause was argued by various
amici, with court appointed experts supplying additional informa-
tion. The district court ordered a full hearing, noting that the
FSIA prohibits the entry of a default judgment against a foreign
sovereign "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to re-
lief by evidence satisfactory to the court."8
The district court initially dismissed the claim against OPEC,
the organization, for lack of proper service. It also determined at
the outset that monetary damages were foreclosed by the indirect-
purchase rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.' This left only a suit
for injunctive relief against the thirteen OPEC nations
individually.10
The case went to trial in this posture and, after extensive
highly complex testimony, the district judge held for the defen-
dants. The court based its decision on (1) a lack of jurisdiction
over the foreign nations pursuant to the FSIA, and the fact that
(2) even if jurisdiction existed, the antitrust action would fail be-
cause foreign sovereigns are not persons within the meaning of the
Sherman Act and because no causal connection existed between
OPEC's activities and domestic price increases.11 In addition, the
court decided that a default judgment could not lie against the
non-appearing defendants and that the defendants had not waived
their immunity."
5. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 (1976).
8. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 477 F. Supp. at 575.
9. 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (antitrust laws would be more effectively enforced by allowing
recovery only to direct purchasers rather than every plaintiff potentially affected).
10. The following nations comprise OPEC: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
11. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 477 F. Supp. at 569-70.
12. Id. at 574-75.
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A key element in the district court's determination that the
FSIA granted immunity was its characterization of OPEC's activi-
ties as "sovereign" in nature as opposed to commercial. ' 3 The sig-
nificance of this determination lies in the exceptions to sovereign
immunity provided for in the Act. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), a
foreign nation engaged in commercial activity in the United States
is not immune from suit based upon that activity."'
The categorization of activity as commercial or non-commer-
cial has been a source of great controversy." Two tests have
emerged, each focusing on a different aspect of the activity. One
test concentrates on the purpose of the activity, the other, on the
nature of the activity. The purpose test provides for greater immu-
nity in that it is a subjective test which looks to the underlying
governmental purpose. The nature test, on the other hand, is more
narrow in that it is objective and focuses upon the nature of the
act itself.16
IAM argued to the ninth circuit that the lower court improp-
erly characterized the activities of OPEC and its member nations
as sovereign and that no immunity should have existed as provided
for in the exceptions to the Act. Specifically, IAM claimed that the
district court's analysis "strayed from the path set forth in the
FSIA." 7 It suggested that the act itself rather than the underlying
sovereign motivations is the proper focus for the inquiry. 9
The circuit court, alluding to the fact that "decisions about oil
are the essence of sovereignty to the OPEC nations,"1 9 affirmed the
dismissal while circumventing the issue of sovereign immunity
under the FSIA. It accomplished this by affirming on the alterna-
tive ground-the act of state doctrine.20
The court's mention of sovereignty in regard to the OPEC na-
tions raises a serious question when considered with the fact that
the FSIA was found not to apply. If the activity of OPEC and its
13. Id. at 567.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) states: "(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdictions of courts of the United States or of the States in any case. . . (2) in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state ....
15. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1357.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1358.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1361.
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member nations was not commercial, but instead, was "sovereign"
in nature, why did the court fail to simply apply the FSIA and find
sovereign immunity? The ninth circuit, in an apparent effort to
move cautiously and to avoid interference with an international re-
lationship involving one of the world's most precious commodities,
opted for a safer alternative. The act of state doctrine permitted
the court to find that the dismissal was proper without addressing
the problematic issue of whether OPEC's activities were suffi-
ciently commercial to require judicial action in this extremely sen-
sitive area. The effect of 'the court's reliance on the act of state
doctrine is that the doctrine has been revitalized following a period
of doubt regarding its effectiveness since the enactment of the
FSIA in 1976.
The act of state doctrine was expressed by the Supreme Court
as early as 1897 in Underhill v. Hernandez,21 where the Court
stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory."
The notion that courts must perceive their limitations when
operating in the international community is a concept which em-
ploys prudential considerations as opposed to technical considera-
tions of jurisdiction. It is a doctrine which involves "respect" for
the sovereignty of other nations and lends itself to changing inter-
pretations based on the particular facts and degree of sensitivity in
a given case. The ninth circuit juxtaposes the act of state doctrine
with the political question doctrine in domestic law. It reasons that
both doctrines require the courts to defer to the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches when those branches are better equipped to re-
solve a sensitive question.
The act of state doctrine was again recognized by the Supreme
Court in Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,2 3 where the Court distin-
guished between the law of sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine. It determined that the law of sovereign immunity
goes to the jurisdiction of the court, whereas, the act of state doc-
21. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
22. Id. at 252, quoted in Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1358.
23. 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
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trine is not jurisdictional.24 Acknowledging the doctrine's constitu-
tional underpinnings, the Supreme Court, in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino3 stated the act of state doctrine "arises out of
the basic relationships between branches of government in a sys-
tem of separation of powers ... .""
It is abundantly clear that the act of state doctrine was alive
and functioning until the enactment of the FSIA in 1976. With the
advent of the FSIA, however, uncertainty developed regarding the
survival of this historical doctrine which claims no constitutional
or statutory source.. In fact, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Cuba 2 7 raised the question of whether the act of state doctrine is
viable subsequent to the adoption of the FSIA.2 ' Although the
question was not resolved, recent decisions, most significantly, In-
ternational Association of Machinists, indicate that the act of
state doctrine can and, in fact, does coexist with the FSIA in the
sphere of international litigation.
The independent nature of the doctrine was pointed out in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,2 where it was deter-
mined that the act of state doctrine could be raised by a private
litigant, even where no sovereign state is a party to the action.3
The FSIA, which goes to jurisdiction, can only be raised by a sov-
ereign nation. 1
The real significance in the application of the act of state doc-
trine in International Association of Machinists is revealed in the
court's assertion that "[tihe act of state doctrine is not diluted by
the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity. 32 This notion permitted the court to accomplish
the same end that could have been achieved via the FSIA without
making a commitment one way or another on the problematic issue
of characterizing the activities of OPEC as commercial or sovereign
in nature. A finding that the activity was commercial would have
extinguished the immunity under the FSIA and would have re-
quired judicial intervention into one of the most delicate areas in
24. Id. at 309.
25. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
26. Id. at 423.
27. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
28. Id. at 705, 705 n.18.
29. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
30. Id. at 606.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
32. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1360.
1982]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
international relations. A determination that such an act was sov-
ereign in nature would have placed unnecessary ammunition in the
hands of OPEC and its member nations giving them a windfall in
the political arena which certainly was uncalled for in light of the
tremendous power OPEC already possessed.
The ninth circuit, therefore, was able to completely avoid en-
tering the political arena by invoking the act of state doctrine in
International Association of Machinists. This common law notion,
that United States courts will not adjudicate politically sensitive
disputes involving acts of foreign states, which surfaced in Un-
derhill, Ricaud, Sabbatino, and Timberlane, prevails notwith-
standing the enactment of the FSIA. International Association of
Machinists demonstrates a significant application of the doctrine
in matters where foreign state activity is commercial in nature and
judicial intervention is inadvisable. Without having to decide
whether the sovereign's activities were commercial or sovereign in
nature, the court was able to abstain relying solely on the act of
state doctrine. Although the FSIA clearly has continuing vitality in
sensitive matters which concern national sovereignty in the inter-
national community, the act of state doctrine can coexist in that
same sphere and offer an effective and meaningful alternative.
ERIC D. ISICOFF
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